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As Ebbinghaus (1908) tells us in the open-
ing words of his popular textbook of psy-
chology, “psychology has a long past but 
only a short history.” In my opinion, there 
are three foundational moments in the his-
tory of psychology and, paradoxically, all 
three are moments of great advancement in 
biology. First, in the long past of psychology, 
psychology did not exist as such but was 
part of philosophy. It is extremely interest-
ing to understand why it has been neces-
sary, at one point of time in the sixteenth 
century, to invent this field and to create a 
signifier – namely “psychology” – separate 
from philosophy, which enabled the field to 
distinguish itself from philosophy (Mengal, 
2000/2001). In this century of religious 
violence, bare corpses lay everywhere and 
progresses in anatomy are major. In 1540, 
the German religious reformer Philippe 
Melanchthon publishes a book which com-
ments the De anima of Aristotle and he com-
pletes the Aristotelian text with a long treaty 
of anatomy (Mengal, 2000/2001). On the 
basis of this new knowledge, Melanchthon 
attributes functions to the body which 
were previously reserved for the soul. The 
brain becomes the principal organ of sen-
sory functions and displaces the heart as 
the seat of emotional life and of thought. 
To the Aristotelian position that all living 
beings, whether plant, animal, or human, 
to varying degrees possess a soul which 
organizes the body, Melanchthon opposes 
a dualistic anthropology which divides 
the human in body and soul. The two-
dimensional “anthropologia” is articulated 
in “anatomia,” science of body, and “psy-
chologia,” science of the soul. It is this new 
anthropology that is diffused into the world 
of the Reformation (Mengal, 2000/2001). 
The Dutch reformer Snellius (1594), for 
example, defines the body and the soul by 
their respective essential property: “The 
rational soul of man is the thought that, 
coupled with the body, completes man. (…) 
The physical things closer to natural bod-
ies that move naturally, have an extension 
and for that reason occupy a space. (…) The 
faculty of the rational soul is the mind or 
will. Thought is the faculty of the soul to dis-
course and think about things which are and 
which are not.”
1 (Snellius, 1594, pp. 26–27). 
It is as a philosopher that René Descartes 
proposes his dualist vision much in line 
with the reformist opinions. Descartes dis-
sects animals and human cadavers and is 
familiar with the research on the flow of 
blood (Fuchs, 2001). He comes to the con-
clusion that the body is a complex device 
that is capable of moving without the soul, 
thus contradicting the Aristotelian doctrine 
of the soul. The metaphysical order, which 
states that the body exists by the soul, is 
broken.
At the end of the seventeenth century, 
this way to present anthropology, science 
of man, in two parts, anatomy and psychol-
ogy, is widespread, mainly in the medical 
literature (Mengal, 2000/2001). However, it 
is not before the middle of the nineteenth 
century that psychology, which is still widely 
regarded as a branch of philosophy, emanci-
pates as an autonomous domain of science. 
Again, this is concomitant with a period of 
great advancement in biology. Indeed, the 
nineteenth century was also the period in 
which physiology, including neurophysiol-
ogy, professionalizes and sees some of its 
most significant discoveries. Among its lead-
ers are Charles Bell and François Magendie 
who independently discover the distinction 
between sensory and motor nerves in the 
spinal column, Johannes Müller who pro-
poses the doctrine of specific nerve energies, 
Emil du Bois-Reymond who studies the 
electrical basis of muscle contraction, Pierre 
Paul Broca and Carl Wernicke who identify 
areas of the brain responsible for differ-
ent aspects of language, as well as Gustav 
Fritsch, Eduard Hitzig, and David Ferrier 
who localize sensory and motor areas of the 
brain (e.g., see Brennan, 1998). One of the 
principal founders of experimental physi-
ology, Hermann von Helmholtz, conducts 
studies of a wide range of topics including 
the natures of sound and color, and of our 
perceptions of them (Warren and Warren, 
1968). In the 1860s, while he holds a posi-
tion in Heidelberg, Helmholtz engages as 
an assistant a young M.D. named Wilhelm 
Wundt. Wundt employs the equipment of 
the physiology laboratory to address more 
complicated psychological questions than 
had not, until then, been investigated exper-
imentally. In 1874 Wundt  publishes his 
landmark textbook, Grundzüge der physiolo-
gische Psychologie (Principles of Physiological 
Psychology) (Wundt, 1874) and in 1879, he 
founds a laboratory specifically dedicated 
to original research in experimental psy-
chology, the first laboratory of its kind in 
the world. Psychology as an autonomous 
domain of science is born.
In other words, it is the confrontation 
with the amazing complexity of the body, 
respectively of the brain, which in the six-
teenth and nineteenth century instigates the 
necessity to invoke, and then to settle, the 
discipline of psychology. What seems to hap-
pen in each of these moments is the recogni-
tion that what was previously ascribed to the 
soul or to the spirit, is in fact taken care of by 
the body. It is very paradoxical that it is pre-
cisely this recognition which, in turn, pro-
motes psychology as an autonomous field. 
In the sixteenth century, the observation that 
anatomy in itself can explain how a body 
comes to move, for example, promotes the 
institution of a field, separate from anatomy, 
for the qualities of the soul which do not 
1Translated by the author from the French translation 
(in Mengal, 2000/2001, p. 10): “L’âme raisonnable de 
l’homme est la pensée qui, conjuguée au corps, para-
chève l’homme. (…) Les choses physiques plus pro-
ches des corps naturels qui se meuvent naturellement, 
possèdent une étendue et à cause de cela occupent un 
lieu.” Original text (Snellius, 1594, pp. 26–27): “Ani-
mus hominis est mens quae corpori coniuncta homi-
nem perficit. (…) Physica pressior in corporibus na-
turalibus, quae physice moventur, magnitudine sunt 
praedita, and propterea locum implent. (…) Ratio-
nalis animae facultas est mens aut voluntas. Mens est 
animae facultas de entibus and non entibus disserens 
and ratiocinans.”
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“neuropsychoanalysis” (e.g., Solms, 2004). 
Fonagy (2003, p. 75) explicitly poses that 
“to be taken seriously as a scientific study of 
the mind, (psychoanalysis) has to engage in 
systematic laboratory studies, epidemiolog-
ical surveys or qualitative exploration in the 
social sciences.” I would be more cautious, 
undecided and open than simply voting 
to rally the proven research methods used 
elsewhere. Indeed, if I might plead for a 
plurality of methodological approaches – 
and there is certainly a lot to say about pos-
sible experimental research in the domain 
of psychoanalysis (e.g., Shevrin, 2001) – I 
would be far more cautious in seeing in 
this recourse the condition sine qua non for 
being taken seriously. Psychoanalysis owes 
to clinics for being psychoanalysis, owes to 
the laborious, lengthy, imprecise, unsystem-
atic, untargeted, unfocused clinical journeys 
for its very identity. If it is in the position 
of proposing a quite different but never-
theless elaborated, systematized psychologi-
cal theory based on logical principles, it is 
for agreeing to engage in these open and 
uncertain clinical journeys. In my opinion, 
this also makes for being a very basis to be 
taken seriously.
When questioned about the future of 
psychoanalysis, Howard Shevrin in an inter-
view in June 2005 said: “What I feel right 
now is that as more and more neuroscien-
tists and cognitive psychologists get into 
studying psychoanalysis, they will begin to 
co-opt psychoanalytic ideas, without giv-
ing psychoanalysis any credit whatsoever. 
They will take what they want to help them 
understand this particular thing and they 
will sadly leave the rest of it. And so even 
psychoanalytical theory may then become 
sort of irrelevant. That is, what they find 
useful they will use, and what they do not 
find useful for their immediate purpose they 
will ignore and discard and they will have 
no appreciation of the fullness and depth of 
psychoanalytical theory. (…) So there has 
to be some way of presenting the overall 
theory in a way that you can not just simply 
pick and choose. You could, but you’re going 
to lose the richness of what the theory has 
to offer in understanding these things. So 
that’s my fear that unless that theory is pre-
sented in a coherent way and in a way that 
takes into account what is actually going on 
right now, that it will simply fall, its bones 
will be picked…” (Bazan, 2010, p. 266).
It seems to me, then, that one of the 
major challenges for psychoanalysis in 
the years and decades to come, will be to 
respond to “this hour of truth” for psychol-
ogy. The way this response is to be articu-
lated remains open, but the challenge lays in 
taking on the game. Indeed, from all elabo-
rated psychological theories, psychoanalysis 
is the one that most clearly is articulated 
at another organizational scale – it is the 
reason why it is so often still preferentially 
used when dealing with clinical problems 
and why it has this epistemological sta-
tus that is often experienced as different 
from the rest. But, more profoundly, it is 
the one theory of which the organizing 
foundational hypotheses are at the subject-
level rather than at the function-level. For 
example, what fundamentally constitutes 
the mental apparatus in psychoanalysis is 
the defensive principle – e.g., repression, 
denial, dissociation, projection, etc., – and 
this is as the same time what clinically fun-
damentally characterizes the subject both 
in his way of taking up his life, and in his 
way of interacting with others. This is to say 
that psychoanalytic theory proposes con-
ceptual tools – a major example being the 
defensive principle – which are at the same 
time highly informative about the organi-
zation of the mental apparatus and about 
the clinical profile of the subject. It seems 
to me no other psychological theory is in 
this position: e.g., functions like memory, 
attention, perception, etc., or cognition 
and intelligence profiles, or eating, sleep-
ing, or other behavioral profiles, though 
informative about the mental apparatus 
and potentially contributing valuable clini-
cal information, seem nevertheless (far) less 
powerful to understand a subject clinically 
than, e.g., his preferential defensive or trans-
ferential modes. It is for this reason, that 
I think it is important for psychoanalysis 
to respond to the changing dynamics and 
stakes in the scientific field of psychology.
This call seems to be heard by various 
psychoanalytic authors, as many are plead-
ing that it is time for psychoanalysis to 
become part of or to reintegrate mainstream 
science (e.g., Kandel, 1999; Hoffman, 2010) 
or “to take its place at the high table of the 
scientific study of the mind” (Fonagy, 2003, 
p. 75) and many are effectively taking steps 
in that direction, either by engaging in more 
systematized and quantified research, or by 
engaging in interdisciplinary research, as is 
seem to have an extension and therefore do 
not occupy a space, such as thought, dis-
course, and will. In the nineteenth century, 
the observation that neurophysiology helps 
to explain perception and language, defini-
tively confirms psychology as a scientific 
discipline, emancipated from philosophy, 
but, paradoxically, though firmly grounded 
in it, also distinct from physiology itself. It is 
as if, by each progress of anatomy or physi-
ology, the more precise description of what 
happens mechanically, allows for a sharper 
definition of what is not explained by the 
sole biological substrate, thereby paradoxi-
cally confirming the necessity of a psycho-
logical science.
I believe that, since the decade of the 
brain (1990–2000) and the introduction of 
brain imagery methodology, we are now in 
a third moment of this dynamic. This time, 
the findings are momentous and no char-
acteristic which still might have been seen 
implicitly as a prerogative of the soul – such 
as emotions, will, intention, motivation, 
love, attachment, empathy, intersubjectivity, 
play, etc., – escapes from biological charac-
terization. These advances in neurosciences 
oblige us to thoroughly revisit the concept 
of what it means for something to be psy-
chological. Indeed, this forward march of 
neurosciences has pushed the whole field of 
psychology to retreat in its ultimate corner, 
leaving open this fundamental question: if 
psychological functions and instances have 
minute and comprehensive brain architec-
tures and can be tied to characterized brain 
dynamic patterns, what then remains to be 
understood as psychological, what then is 
psychology? What this amounts to, in my 
opinion, is that if the necessity for a psy-
chological science resists nevertheless, that 
some “hour of truth” for psychology has 
arrived: not a specific function makes psy-
chology psychology – nor consciousness, 
nor will, nor emotion, nor agency, nor, for 
that matter, the unconscious – but organi-
zation principles different from those at the 
biological level. In the same way biology 
does not consist of elements different than 
already present at the chemical level, but 
is concerned with another organizational 
scale, psychology does not consist of func-
tions, modules, components different than 
what might be characterized as such at the 
biological level, but is concerned with a 
radically different organizational scale than 
biology.
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I’m not sure it should be the speculation 
of the gains and losses – which, as a cli-
nician knows, are a priori always and for 
everybody unsettled – which should form 
the motive to take on the game. Rather, it 
is the game itself, the sole faithfulness to 
something that is happening, which should 
be decisive. Something is happening, which 
clearly and loudly summons psychoanalysis 
to respond; as said, how to respond, is not a 
priori clear, but a non-response would imply 
a certain loss.
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So, one proposal for responding to the 
forward march of neurosciences might 
minimally imply “taking into account 
what is actually going on right now” and 
an endeavor to present the theory “in a 
coherent way.” This, I wish, is what this 
journal “Frontiers in Psychoanalysis and 
Neuropsychoanalysis” wants to be a forum 
for: it welcomes any contribution in the field 
of psychoanalysis which is willing to present 
itself in a coherent way and willing to take 
into account what is going on right now, 
or, minimally, to indicate its awareness of 
the actual context. The signifier “neuropsy-
choanalysis” in the title is there to function 
as an enabling condition, not as a necessary 
condition.
Finally, a lot of practising psychoanalysts 
might have this question: what is there to 
win for psychoanalysis to take recent neu-
roscience advances into account, or, even, to 
play a part in the making of science, of psy-
chological science? Let me respond in the 
most analytical way: I do not know. There 
is no agenda for what there is to win, nor, 
for that matter, for what there is to loose. 
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